























We are often told that we live at a 
time of ethical crisis. There is some-
thing “profoundly wrong with the way 
we live today”, writes Tony Judt (2010a: 
1). We have somehow lost our ethical 
bearings; “we have no language to use. 
‘This is wrong’ has long since ceased to 
have validity as a political statement” 
(Bunting, 2010: 5). And this leaves us, 
Michael Sandel contends, in a state of 
“restless impatience with politics as it 
is”. We need to revive the language of ci-
vic virtue; we need urgently to initiate a 
process of “moral and civic renewal” in 
Western democracies. And, for Sandel, 
the way to achieve such renewal is by the 
cultivation of a “politics of the common 
good” directed at the pursuit of the good 
society (Sandel, 2009).
But it is very hard to see how any 
such process of renewal might come 
about. If ours is a time of ethical crisis, 
then it is also a time of financial crisis, 
a time of gnawing insecurity and deep 
moral conflict. In these circumstan-
ces of profound uncertainty, Sandel’s ap-
peal to the politics of the common good 
can all too easily assume a kind of fairy-
tale quality. Our turbulent times have 
prompted many people to think less 
about the good life and the good soci-
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ety and more about their basic needs for 
safety and reassurance. And this sense of 
mismatch between the preoccupations 
of the academics on the one hand and 
the real social and political problems 
we face on the other can paradoxically 
function to exacerbate the ethical crisis 
by fostering feelings of moral despair. If 
the academics have nothing construc-
tive to say about public morality when 
insecurity is rife and the ‘common good’ 
is incomprehensible to us, then perhaps 
we must conclude that there is no basis 
for public morality in such conditions. 
Alternatively, the sense of mismatch will 
prompt charges of intellectual irrespon-
sibility. Polite discussion of the politics 
of the common good may be an enter-
taining diversion for middle class aca-
demics with nothing more pressing to 
think about, but they are guilty, so the 
criticism runs, of fiddling while Rome 
(or Athens or London) burns.
My aim in this short introduction is 
to sketch a rather different model of the 
structure of public morality and in so 
doing to show how practices of civic vir-
tue may continue to make sense in cir-
cumstances of pronounced moral con-
flict and insecurity.1 In this way, I want 
to resist the counsel of despair that there 
is no basis for public morality in uncer-
tain times. However, I shall contend that 
in order to appreciate what basis there is, 
we will need to inaugurate a fairly dra-
matic change of perspective. Political 
philosophy has typically concentrated 
too heavily on positive moral notions, 
on common goods and civic ideals, and 
a fundamental reorientation is now re-
1 This is a very brief summary, then, of an ar-
gument I have elaborated at much greater 
length and depth in my book, Civic Virtue 
and the Sovereignty of Evil (Edyvane, 2012).
quired. In her book, The Sovereignty of 
Good, Iris Murdoch remarks that “good 
political philosophy is not necessari-
ly good moral philosophy” (Murdoch, 
2001: 79). I submit that the reverse is 
also true: in the domain of public mo-
rality, we must acknowledge the sove-
reignty of evil.
The Dualistic Model 
of Public Morality
Whilst many authors agree that we 
need to rehabilitate civic virtue in pub-
lic life, their opinions diverge in a rath-
er puzzling way when it comes to the 
question of what the point of civic vir-
tue is meant to be. Many, like Sandel, ar-
gue that the point of civic virtue is to fa-
cilitate the pursuit and realisation of the 
good society: the better kind of politics 
we need is a politics oriented less to the 
pursuit of individual self-interest and 
more to the pursuit of the common good 
(Sandel, 2009). But others, and Judt is a 
prominent example here, suppose that 
the point of public morality is quite dif-
ferent. Instead of helping us to pursue 
the common good, its central point and 
purpose is to avert disaster: to prevent 
the “complete breakdown of liberal insti-
tutions” and the “utter disintegration of 
the democratic consensus” (Judt, 2009). 
Thus, while Sandel associates civic vir-
tue with the politics of hope, Judt associ-
ates it with the politics of fear.
Now, it is tempting to see this as no-
thing more than the reflection of Sandel’s 
optimism and Judt’s pessimism. In this 
way, Michael Walzer suggests that the 
politics of hope and the politics of fear 
are really just two sides of the same coin. 
In fact, Walzer argues that the politics 
of fear depends on the politics of hope 
(Walzer, 1996). A fearful politics needs 























so, we might presume, Judt’s fearful view 
of public morality is fearful on behalf of 
something like Sandel’s hopeful view of 
public morality. In this way, Walzer’s ac-
count suggests a neat continuity, even 
symmetry, between the positive and the 
negative aspects of public morality.
But I dispute that view. I propose in-
stead a dualistic model of public mora-
lity whereby public life is the awkward 
amalgamation of two entirely distinct 
modes of political activity. More precise-
ly, my suggestion is that the distinction 
between the politics of hope and the po-
litics of fear is cut across by a second dis-
tinction between aspirational political 
activity, which is oriented towards the 
realisation of ideals, and preventive po-
litical activity, which is oriented towards 
the prevention of great evils. Thus, I pro-
pose that public morality is composed of 
two modes of activity – aspiration and 
prevention – and that each of those two 
modes has a positive (or hopeful) face 
and a negative (or fearful) face. While 
there may be symmetry across the hope/
fear divide, there will be conflict across 
the aspiration/prevention divide. Thus, 
on my account, Sandel and Judt are to 
be understood (rather crudely) as repre-
sentatives of two wholly different poli-
tical agendas: Sandel is to be associated 
with the hopeful face of the politics of 
aspiration, whereas Judt is to be associ-
ated with the fearful face of the politics 
of prevention. There is no reason to sup-
pose that their respective ethical agen-
das will display any kind of continuity or 
symmetry.
The attraction of the dualistic model 
is that it enables us to make better sense 
of situations in which positive and nega-
tive ethical agendas for public life con-
flict. Sometimes acting in order to avert 
disaster and the catastrophic collapse 
of democratic institutions will demand 
the violation and betrayal of one’s ethi-
cal aspirations for public life. We see this 
clearly enough in practices of tolera-
tion. Often regarded as a practice inte-
gral to the health of a liberal democracy, 
toleration may well require us to betray 
our ideal vision of society and of those 
who would inhabit it for the sake of get-
ting along peaceably with those among 
whom we do as a matter of fact live. In 
such cases there seems to be asymmetry 
between the politics of hope and the po-
litics of fear. This sort of antagonism is 
hard to understand on Walzer’s monistic 
model of public morality; but it makes 
a lot more sense on the dualistic model. 
The dualistic model suggests that in this 
situation the tolerant agent finds herself 
torn between the claims of the hopeful 
face of the politics of aspiration (which 
dictate intolerance of those who have 
no place in her social and political ide-
al) and the claims of the fearful face of 
the politics of prevention (which dictate 
toleration for the sake of civic peace and, 
at the limit, for the prevention of civil 
war).
The Sovereignty of Evil
The dualistic model of public mora-
lity also helps us better to comprehend 
practices of civic virtue in the sorts of 
conditions I described at the outset, con-
ditions of uncertainty and of conflicting 
ethical aspirations. Because we are think-
ing now in terms of two discrete schemes 
of public morality – the aspirational and 
the preventive – it is quite possible that, 
while there is disagreement and even 
conflict on the aspirational side, there 
may yet be consensus on the preventive 
side. In other words, we can make sense 
of practices of civic virtue in conditions 
























far as we regard those practices as being 
oriented to the prevention of commonly 
recognised evils rather than the pursuit 
of aspirations (which are the subject of 
profound disagreement).
Note that the argument here is not 
merely that we ought to take the idea of 
evil more seriously when we think about 
public morality. We need to be clear 
about what is meant by ‘evil’ in this con-
text. I suggest that there is a ‘basic’ no-
tion of evil which functions simply as a 
description of terrible human suffering. 
The great evils of human life are those 
states of affairs in which such suffering 
occurs. Within this category of basic evil 
there is an important distinction to be 
made between ‘contingent basic evils’ 
and ‘sovereign basic evils’. Contingent 
basic evils are those that are identifiable 
only in the light of an antecedently ac-
knowledged scheme of particular posi-
tive values, whereas sovereign basic evils 
are immediately felt as evils by any nor-
mally responsive person. 
For example, then, many egalitarians 
will regard as a basic evil any inequali-
ties of wealth and status that are not ar-
ranged to the benefit of the least well off. 
On my account, the evil of inequality so 
described is a contingent evil. Such in-
equality is not immediately felt as a great 
evil. In order to perceive inegalitari-
an social arrangements as evil, it is first 
necessary to recognise a particular way 
of life and a set of moral ideas that attach 
value to equality. Only in the light of that 
positive valuation does the evil of equa-
lity violated become apparent. Those 
who uphold conservative moral beliefs, 
and who place value on the preservation 
of traditional social (and economic) hie-
rarchies, cannot be expected to see such 
inequality as an evil.
The basic evil of extreme poverty is 
different. Think of the visceral depic-
tions of poverty in John Steinbeck’s The 
Grapes of Wrath, like the “wasted face” 
and the “wide, frightened eyes” of the 
starving man described at the novel’s 
end (Steinbeck, 2000: 476). Such ima-
ges elicit immediate feelings of “aesthe-
tic revulsion” quite independently of any 
prior understanding one might have of 
a particularly valued way of life from 
which extreme poverty constitutes a fall-
ing away.2 Indeed, circumstances of ex-
treme poverty upset the very possibility 
of forming a stable set of moral beliefs 
of any kind, and egalitarians and con-
servatives will usually be united in their 
abhorrence of the very great evil of ex-
treme poverty. Thus, the evil of poverty 
so described is not a contingent evil, but 
rather a sovereign evil of human life.
Alongside extreme poverty, oth-
er such sovereign evils might include 
the evils of disease, starvation, humilia-
tion, abject despair and the mutilations 
of war. It is not unreasonable to contend 
that these evils are universal in human 
life and traceable to the features of our 
common humanity. This is not to say 
that everyone would necessarily agree 
on any particular list of the sovereign 
evils – we know perfectly well that they 
do not. The universalist’s argument here 
would need to be that those who failed 
to recognise, say, the great evil of starva-
tion had been somehow distracted from 
their natural feelings, perhaps by a theo-
ry – a set of religious or political beliefs – 
that functioned to explain those feelings 
away (see Hampshire, 1999: 9). To be 
sure, this kind of response could never 
be decisive, but it does help to show why 
2 The idea of ‘aesthetic revulsion’ is from Tony 























it is not absurd to posit the universality 
of certain evils even in the face of factual 
disagreement about those evils.
The idea, then, is not simply that we 
need to take the concept of evil more 
seriously, but more specifically that we 
have to acknowledge the category of 
sovereign evil, which corresponds to the 
preventive ethic, as contrasted with the 
category of contingent evil, which corre-
sponds to the aspirational ethic. In con-
ditions of divergent ethical aspirations, 
conceptions of contingent evil will also 
diverge and so the appeal to contingent 
evil does not provide a compelling basis 
for public morality in such conditions. 
Conceptions of sovereign evil, by con-
trast, need not diverge (because asym-
metric to aspirations) and could there-
fore provide a secure basis for practices 
of civic virtue in the uncertain times in 
which we now live. 
Preventive Virtue
In the prevention of sovereign basic 
evils, it is possible to discern a distinc-
tive form of civic virtue. Stuart Hamp-
shire writes that by reflecting on the 
great (sovereign) evils of human life “one 
may come to understand better, and to 
identify more distinctly, the ordinary 
and indispensable decencies of public 
life which may be overlooked in the pro-
jection of liberal ideas of social improve-
ment” (Hampshire, 1989: 68). In this 
context, civic virtue describes the habits, 
dispositions and qualities of character 
that citizens need to display if they are to 
contribute to the prevention or mitiga-
tion of sovereign evil. In this way, civic 
virtue loses the aspirational quality with 
which it is so often imbued and takes on 
a more prohibitive character, yielding 
a public morality of ordinary, everyday 
decency. 
More concretely, we can see the sort 
of preventive ethic I have in mind here at 
work in the context of ‘austerity Britain’ 
after the Second World War. While now-
adays austerity is usually understood as 
an essentially economic condition, one 
that describes a falling away from con-
ditions of prosperity, in the post-war 
years austerity “aspired to a public ethic” 
(Judt, 2010b). As the Labour Party ma-
nifesto of 1945, Let Us Face the Future, 
declared: “We need the spirit of Dun-
kirk and the Blitz sustained over a peri-
od of years” (quoted in Kynaston, 2007: 
21-22). Here austerity is not a descrip-
tion of the desolate economic condition 
in which people found themselves, but 
rather a particular way of responding to 
that condition, a particular way of living 
with scarcity, vulnerability and uncer-
tainty that was meant to be choicewor-
thy and admirable.
The austerity ethic comprised the 
virtue of austerity itself, a virtue of self-
-denial, moral fortitude and self-sacri-
fice. And it also incorporated a cluster 
of other closely associated virtues in-
cluding justice, civic friendship and so-
cial hope. The key interest of the aus-
terity ethic and its associated virtues is 
that they were fundamentally preventive 
in their orientation. Few apart from the 
most ambitious of the social planners in 
the Labour government supposed that 
the practice of austerity was a means to 
the realisation of the ideal society. To in-
terpret austerity in that way would be 
to confuse it with asceticism. Asceti-
cism is associated with aspirational mo-
rality and is to be understood as a pro-
gramme of self-denial and self-sacrifice 
implemented as a means to the realisa-
tion of some great good, such as salva-
tion in the case of some religious ascet-
























an ethical concept, but it is one associat-
ed not with the pursuit of aspiration, but 
rather with the prevention of sovereign 
evil. We can see this clearly enough in 
the Labour Party manifesto which called 
for the practice of austerity not in order 
to realise the ideal society, but in order 
to insure “against rainy days” (Kynaston, 
2007: 21). Likewise, William Beveridge’s 
‘Social Insurance and Allied Services 
Report’, which paved the way for the 
creation of the National Health Service 
in Britain, derived its impetus not from 
some sort of utopian social democratic 
vision, but rather from the need to tack-
le the five Giant Evils of Want, Disease, 
Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness (Be-
veridge, 1942/n.d.).
The preventive virtues I have asso-
ciated with the austerity ethic may at 
first blush seem entirely familiar and 
not very distinctive at all. The virtue of 
justice has a central place in almost eve-
ry aspirational morality one might care 
to mention. Civic friendship and social 
hope are slightly less familiar, but still 
very far from unheard of in aspiration-
al contexts. However, in the context of 
the preventive ethic, these familiar vir-
tues take on an altogether different co-
louration. No longer is justice to be in-
terpreted as a means to the “realistic 
utopia” of a “well-ordered society”,3 but 
is instead to be interpreted in procedur-
al terms, as a way of dealing with conflict 
so as to prevent the catastrophic collapse 
of civilised life into conditions of anar-
chy and civil war. Similarly, civic friend-
ship is not interpreted as a means to the 
realisation of some romantic, commu-
nitarian ideal, but instead as a bulwark 
against the enmity, hostility and misan-
3 Of course, the language here is that of John 
Rawls (1971; 1996).
thropy that might otherwise poison the 
diverse and antagonistic democratic col-
lective. And finally, the virtue of social 
hope is not to be understood in terms of 
the grandiose, even messianic, utopian 
hopes of aspirational social movements 
past and present (there was, of course, 
more than a trace of that sort of thing in 
the rhetoric of the Obama presidential 
campaign), but instead as a much more 
mundane ‘ordinary hope’ of the kind 
that sustains most friendships and fami-
lies and consists primarily in the simple 
disposition to resist the sovereign evil of 
abject despair, and to keep going.
To be sure, this catalogue of preven-
tive virtues will seem extremely mod-
est and minimalistic when set along-
side the catalogues of virtues associated 
with all manner of aspirational morali-
ties, and that may in turn fuel a sense of 
disappointment among those who have 
called for the rehabilitation of civic vir-
tue in public life. To that sort of con-
cern I would respond first that, modest 
though it may be, it is the best we can 
reasonably hope for in the social and 
political conditions in which we find 
ourselves. And, secondly, I would sug-
gest that it is in any case the wrong con-
trast to be making. The preventive ethic 
will always seem thin and disappointing 
when set alongside one’s preferred as-
pirational ideal, but we should ask our-
selves instead how the preventive ethic 
looks when set alongside a world of de-
solation and terror in which life is eve-
rywhere nasty, brutish and short. That is 
the salient contrast from the perspective 
of the preventive ethic. And from that 
perspective, the practice of preventive 
virtue may seem a rather more momen-
tous achievement and, what is more, an 
























If we are to make sense of practices 
of civic virtue in conditions of conflict 
and insecurity, then it will be in terms 
of the preventive austerity ethic or not at 
all. The practices of ordinary, everyday 
decency in which democratic citizens 
sometimes participate cannot be inter-
preted as practices aimed at the pursuit 
of the common good or the good soci-
ety. In contexts of insecurity and con-
flicts of aspiration those sorts of pursuits 
seem irrelevant at best, and possibly just 
incoherent. That realisation can easi-
ly provoke a sense of moral despair and 
the belief that there is no ground at all 
for civic virtue in the social and political 
conditions in which we find ourselves. 
By articulating the dualistic model of 
public morality and the category of so-
vereign evil, I have attempted to assuage 
that concern and to resist the counsel of 
despair. It is possible to make sense of 
practices of ordinary decency in condi-
tions of moral conflict and insecurity in 
so far as we are able to interpret those 
practices as being oriented not to the 
pursuit of aspiration, but instead to the 
prevention of the sovereign evils of hu-
man life. 
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Građanska vrlina i suverenitet zla
SAŽETAK Autor pojašnjava glavne kategorije i argumente koje zagovara u svojoj knjizi Ci-
vic Virtue and the Sovereignty of Evil: Political Ethics in Uncertain Times (knjiga izlazi u drugoj 
polovici 2012). Autor nudi dvojno razumijevanje javnog moraliteta, uspoređujući aspira-
cijsku s preventivnom politikom i argumentirajući da je preventivna politika često zane-
marivana u suvremenoj političkoj teoriji. Nastavlja uvodeći ideju suvereniteta zla i pojaš-
njavajući njenu ulogu u konstituiranju preventivnih građanskih vrlina. Autor zaključuje 
tvrdeći kako se smisleno prakticiranje građanskih vrlina u uvjetima sukoba i nesigurnosti 
treba voditi preventivnom etikom.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI preventivna politika, zlo, građanske vrline, sukob, štedljivost
